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THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT
AS A MODEL OF REGULATION
RICHARD D. CUDAHY*
1
This anniversary of the Interstate Commerce Act (Act) reminds us
that this historic statute—corrective of notorious railroad abuses in the
nineteenth century—is the model for “direct” regulation of business at
both the state and federal level. In recent decades, this model, or
“original paradigm,” of regulation has been widely supplanted by a
2
“new paradigm.” The new paradigm is characterized by a narrowed
application of direct regulation to bottlenecks or areas of monopoly
power, as opposed to areas where competition in a relevant market is
arguably adequate to maximize consumer welfare, induce efficiency, and
adequately discipline the economic process without government
intervention.
So the world has changed. Whereas the original paradigm was held
to be applicable (as a constitutional matter) to businesses characterized
3
as “affected with a public interest,” today the regulation of these same
enterprises, which include public utilities, is usually said to depend (as
an economic matter) on finding them to be capital-intensive “natural
monopolies,” in which marginal cost remains below average cost over a
full range of output and a sole provider is more efficient than
competition.
For example, state public service commissions
traditionally regulated the electric power industry, but under the new
paradigm, transmission and distribution are directly regulated, while
generation is treated as workably competitive and spared government
economic surveillance.
But the original paradigm is still useful. Direct regulation, as in the
Interstate Commerce Act, generally involves principles of public
interest applied by a regulatory authority (usually a commission) to
commercial enterprises so as to combine the supposed efficiency of
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Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1324–27 (1998).
3. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126, 130 (1877) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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private enterprise with social needs supposedly democratically derived.
This permits, the theory goes, surveillance of service as well as price, but
we also know now that it is arguably less effective and more open to
improper influence than free and fair competition in a market, as
prevails in the economy generally. In these circumstances, in evaluating
the nature of regulatory measures, one must attach appropriate
importance to the evils sought to be corrected by regulation.
As all concede, in the case of the Act, the prime evil was
discrimination in price and in other respects, highlighted by railroad rate
favoritism to the Standard Oil Company, greatly enhancing its
dominance.
There was also acute concern about geographic
discrimination disadvantaging certain agricultural areas and crops and
giving rise to the undue favoring of long hauls over short. So it is not
surprising that the Act not only moved sweepingly against
discrimination (for its primary substantive end) but also deployed a
uniform filed rate at the expense of a contract rate established in a
4
competitive market (for its procedural means). As a further measure
strongly advancing uniformity, totally destructive of competition, and
also adverse to discrimination, the Act as amended authorized rate
5
bureaus for collective rate-making.
As modified by subsequent legislation, the Act empowered the
commission that it created to fix maximum railroad rates based on
reasonableness and justice. This was a model for public-utility ratesetting, which usually involved establishment of a rate base reflecting
invested capital and a rate structure generating revenues sufficient to
cover expenses plus a return on the rate base sufficient to attract capital.
The rate structure was then to distribute revenues to services generally
in accordance with costs.
After the advent of the new paradigm, by contrast, there are still
strictures against discrimination, but with less blunt tools than uniform
rates on public file. Instead, the paradigm relies on competition, which
(in a puzzling parallel) also involves price discrimination, although these
price differences are presumably justified by cost. Perhaps the main
reason for moving from the original paradigm to the market model was
6
ideological, part of what has been called the “capitalist revolution,”
4. See Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 119–21 (1990) (and
authorities cited).
5. Ch. 3591, § 4, 34 Stat. 584, 589 (1906).
6. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 2, at 1397.
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which has been dominant since the 1980s, but which has been shaken by
the recent financial crisis and economic downturn.
The move to the market paradigm from a regime of direct
government regulation has been most unquestioned in industries, such
as motor carriers and airlines, having no natural monopoly
characteristics. But at least in the case of the airlines, deregulation has
not been free of apparently fundamental problems.
Economic
7
regulation of the airlines by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 was
introduced not primarily to protect consumers but to make the industry
viable and capable of being financed. The period of direct regulation,
8
ended in 1978, has been the only one during which airlines have been
profitable and apparently viable for the long term. Destructive
competition—nonexistent in theory but a practical reality—is without
any clear solution but seems to be leading to ever more massive
consolidation within the industry—not a favorable omen for workable
competition.
The Interstate Commerce Act, adopted in 1887, was a long time in
gestation and at various times attracted some industry support, based in
9
part on its potential for various sorts of joint ratemaking. But it was
more beginning than end. The contest that the Act signaled between
the advocates of government regulation and exclusive reliance on
natural forces and the market continues today.
This contest is prominent, for example, in the debate about “net
neutrality” in the world of communications and the Internet. Net
neutrality essentially means the historic openness of the Internet and the
principles necessary to protect and promote it.
The Federal
Communications Commission recently approved net neutrality rules, in
an effort to increase Internet service provider transparency; to prevent
the blocking of access to any legal services, applications, and content;
and to prohibit wired providers from “unreasonable discrimination” of
10
content or services. Opponents of such regulation argue that Internet
communication has developed historically through the action of market
forces free of regulation and giving maximum scope to innovation and
creativity—and that future progress is threatened by regulation.
Advocates of regulation, on the other hand, not unlike their
7. Ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (1938).
8. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
9. RICHARD WHITE, RAILROADED: THE TRANSCONTINENTALS AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN AMERICA 355–65 (2011).
10. Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905, 17906 (2010).
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predecessors in the 1880s, see discrimination, perhaps in the form of fees
11
for assured access and priority, as a major threat to net neutrality.
The Interstate Commerce Commission may be gone. However, the
larger battle goes on as to whether regulation controls the abuses of
freedom or obstructs the creative process springing from unregulated
freedom—or at least as to which of these functions is dominant.

11. Theodore A. Livingston & Christian F. Binnig, Net Neutrality: Point and
Counterpoint, INFRASTRUCTURE, Fall 2010, at 3, 3–5. The matter is further explored in the
following (and concluding) essay in this remembrance of the Interstate Commerce Act upon
the occasion of its 125th anniversary. James B. Speta, Supervising Discrimination: Reflections
of the Interstate Commerce Act in the Broadband Debate, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1195 (2012).

